Few countries in the modern world have demonstrated such a consistent willingness to mortgage their sovereignty as Pakistan. Since its creation in 1947, Pakistan’s most enduring political institution has not been parliament, the constitution, or the ballot box. It has been the military establishment headquartered in Rawalpindi. Time and again, the Pakistan Army and its intelligence services have shown that national interest, democratic legitimacy, and regional stability are expendable when weighed against foreign patronage, military aid, and elite survival.
The latest controversy surrounding the leaked diplomatic cypher linked to the ouster of former Prime Minister Imran Khan only reinforces what many Pakistanis have long suspected: when Washington signals displeasure, the generals in Rawalpindi listen.
Whether one agrees with Khan or not, the broader pattern is unmistakable. Pakistan’s deep state has repeatedly aligned itself with external powers, particularly the United States, even when doing so undermines Pakistan’s own democracy and strategic autonomy. This is not a new phenomenon. It is the organizing principle of Pakistan’s national security state.
A Country Built on Strategic Rent
Pakistan’s military establishment has perfected the art of strategic rent-seeking. During the Cold War, Pakistan positioned itself as a frontline state against communism and was rewarded with billions of dollars in military and economic assistance. During the Soviet–Afghan War, it became the principal conduit for American and Saudi funds to the Afghan jihad.
After the September 11 attacks, Pakistan once again reinvented itself as Washington’s indispensable ally in the “War on Terror.” The rewards were enormous: military aid, diplomatic backing, and international legitimacy.
Yet the duplicity was equally staggering. While accepting American assistance, elements within Pakistan’s security establishment continued to support extremist groups. The most glaring symbol of this double game was the discovery of Osama bin Laden living in Abbottabad, a short distance from Pakistan’s premier military academy.
Pakistan managed to extract rents from both sides of the conflict while ordinary Pakistanis paid the price in instability, radicalization, and economic stagnation.
Democracy as Collateral Damage
Whenever civilian leaders attempt to pursue a more independent course, they encounter the same obstacle: the military establishment’s dependence on foreign patronage.
This dynamic has shaped the fate of multiple elected leaders. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was overthrown and executed after falling out with the military. Nawaz Sharif was repeatedly removed when his agenda diverged from the establishment’s priorities. Now Khan argues that his refusal to conform to Washington’s expectations contributed to his removal.
The leaked cypher, if accurately reported, suggests that American displeasure over Khan’s foreign policy was quickly internalized by Pakistan’s power brokers. Whether one calls it a conspiracy or coercive diplomacy, the outcome was familiar: an elected leader was removed and the military’s preferred political order was restored.
In Pakistan, democracy remains conditional. Governments are tolerated only so long as they do not challenge Rawalpindi’s relationships with foreign benefactors.
Asim Munir and the Continuity of Dependency
Under General Asim Munir, Pakistan has shown little sign of strategic independence. Instead, the military leadership appears focused on regaining international favor, particularly in Washington, while presiding over political repression and economic deterioration at home.
Munir’s tenure has coincided with a deepening crisis of legitimacy. Opposition leaders have been jailed, media pressure has intensified, and public confidence in institutions has eroded. Yet Pakistan’s military establishment continues to market itself abroad as the only force capable of preserving order.
This dependence severely undermines Islamabad’s credibility on the world stage. A state whose own foreign policy is often shaped by external pressure can scarcely claim to be a neutral mediator in major international conflicts.
Why Pakistan Cannot Mediate the Iran–United States tensions
Recent efforts to portray Pakistan as a potential intermediary in tensions involving Iran and the United States are difficult to take seriously. Pakistan’s track record is defined by strategic ambiguity and shifting loyalties. Reports that Pakistani facilities may have quietly supported Iranian military assets even while Islamabad sought to facilitate dialogue with Washington only reinforce long-standing concerns about duplicity. Moreover, Pakistan lacks the core attributes of a credible mediator: institutional coherence, strategic autonomy, and international trust.
Countries that successfully mediate conflicts do so because they are viewed as stable and independent actors. Pakistan, by contrast, remains deeply constrained by its military establishment’s reliance on external sponsors and its habit of balancing contradictory commitments.
The Real Cost to Pakistan
The tragedy is that this model has enriched a narrow elite while leaving the country weakened. Pakistan’s economy remains chronically fragile. Democratic institutions are repeatedly undermined. Civilian leaders govern under constant pressure. Foreign policy is shaped less by national consensus than by the preferences of unelected actors and their overseas interlocutors.
The result is a nation trapped in a cycle of dependency, forever seeking the next bailout, the next aid package, or the next geopolitical crisis that can be monetized.
A State Without Strategic Sovereignty
Pakistan’s core challenge is not merely economic or political. It is structural. As long as the military establishment treats sovereignty as a tradable asset and democracy as expendable, Pakistan will struggle to achieve genuine stability. The cypher controversy is therefore more than a dispute about one leader’s removal. It is a reminder of a deeper reality: Pakistan’s most powerful institution has repeatedly chosen foreign patronage over democratic accountability. Until that changes, Islamabad will remain less a sovereign actor than a strategic subcontractor, available, as always, to the highest bidder.
