The latest Iran war, especially after February 2026, has changed the meaning of control over the Strait of Hormuz. After repeated clashes between Iran and Israel, followed by direct American involvement and a prolonged confrontation with Tehran, control of Hormuz is no longer simply about whether oil tankers can pass. It has become a test of sovereignty, deterrence, alliance credibility and the limits of great-power pressure.
Whoever can credibly disrupt Hormuz can affect the economic decisions of countries far beyond the Middle East. The United States Energy Information Administration estimates that petroleum liquids passing through the strait averaged 4.9 million barrels a day in the second quarter of 2026. Before the conflict, the figure was 21.6 million barrels a day.
Iran does not need to completely close the strait to gain strategic value from it. It only needs to make commercial shipping dangerous, uncertain or difficult. Recent attacks on vessels, conflicting claims about whether the waterway is open, and the sharp fall in shipping show how this works. Reuters reported that only a small number of commodity vessels were passing through the strait during the stand-off, while Iran and Washington gave different accounts of its status. A choke point becomes powerful not when every ship is physically stopped, but when shipowners decide that using the route is no longer worth the risk.
This is why the political importance of Hormuz is greater now than during way earlier Iranian threats to close it. In the past, the threat was mainly a possibility. Today, the strait is part of an actual war whose effects stretch from Iran to the Gulf and beyond. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, writing in Survival, argues that there is no realistic military way to simply reopen the waterway under current conditions. This reveals the central problem: military power may protect individual ships, but it cannot easily create political stability.
Iran’s leverage, however, should not be seen as unlimited. As Kamran Taremi explains in Iranian Studies, Iranian territory and islands overlook the passage. But Iran also depends on access to the Gulf. A long-term closure would even hurt Iranian trade, exports and relations with neighbouring countries as well as its enemies. Tehran can increase the cost of using the waterway, but it cannot avoid the consequences of prolonged isolation.
The war has changed the political calculation because Iran now has fewer reasons to act. At the same time, restraint will automatically protect its economic interests. When a country believes that its own security is already under direct attack, the line between escalation and deterrence becomes very thin. Iran needs to accept this reality at large. Hormuz can then become a bargaining tool and it does not necessarily have to be permanently closed. The threat of disruption alone can force Washington, Gulf monarchies, Asian energy importers and European governments to consider the economic cost of continuing the war.
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman have long depended on American security guarantees while maintaining different levels of engagement with Iran. If Washington cannot guarantee safe and predictable navigation without a prolonged confrontation, Gulf governments have a reason to diversify their diplomatic relationships, strengthen regional security arrangements and reduce their dependence on one outside power. Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh’s Security and Territoriality in the Persian Gulf shows why maritime geography cannot be separated from questions of sovereignty, territory and regional security.
Asian economies are particularly vulnerable because the Gulf remains an important source of their energy. Even countries that buy little or no Iranian oil can suffer from higher energy prices, shipping costs, insurance premiums and inflation. Poorer countries that depend heavily on imports face the greatest risks because they have less money available to absorb energy shocks.
The legal questions are also important. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea establishes navigation rights and limits the ability of a coastal state to block lawful passage. The basic principle is clear: an international waterway cannot become the private property of whichever country has the stronger navy. The United Nations secretary-general has called for the restoration of navigation rights and freedoms around the strait, warning that continued escalation could have serious consequences for international peace and security and the global economy.
International law therefore looks at the situation in Hormuz through several competing principles: freedom of navigation, the sovereignty of coastal states and the prohibition on the unlawful use of force. The strait’s status as an international waterway is especially important. Transit passage is protected for international navigation, while countries bordering the strait still have important sovereign and security interests. At the same time, deliberate attacks on commercial ships or unlawful interference with navigation can raise questions under international humanitarian law and the UN Charter. Neither Iran’s geographic position nor America’s military power gives either side an unlimited legal right to control the waterway by force.
There is also an important lesson about American power. Washington can send naval forces, impose sanctions, escort ships and threaten economic retaliation. But military power alone cannot solve the political problem created by a war involving Iran, Israel and several regional actors. Caitlin Talmadge’s analysis in Foreign Affairs makes this point in strategic terms: Hormuz gives Iran asymmetric advantages, making the task of reopening the strait much more difficult than simply sending naval forces into the Gulf.
The biggest consequence is that Hormuz has become a bargaining arena over the future of the regional order. If Iran can use disruption of shipping to win diplomatic concessions, it strengthens the credibility of coercive deterrence. If the United States responds with an indefinite blockade and further escalation, it could show that even an overwhelming military power cannot restore normal shipping without a political settlement.
Hormuz is not Iranian territory, as Iran has signed UNCLOS though it has not fully ratified it. However, it is probable that Tehran cannot control global trade forever. But the war has shown that physical control of the entire strait is not necessary to exercise political influence. Fear, uncertainty and the possibility of disruption can be enough.
Therefore, the eventual settlement will matter far beyond the Gulf. It will determine whether Hormuz returns to being a shared artery of global commerce or remains a reminder that, in an age of fragmented power, geography can still hold the world economy hostage.
